Abstract. Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non-monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.
Scalar Implicatures
In contemporary pragmatics, the Gricean maxims (see [6, pp. 26-27] ) are interpreted not as actual maxims, but as heuristic markers for both speakers and hearers (see e.g. [1] , [10] ).
Instead of thinking about them as rules (or rules of thumb) or behavioral norms, it is useful to think of them as primarily inferential heuristics which then motivate the behavioral norms. (sic, [10, p. 35 ])
The maxims provide speakers the guidelines to model their utterances in a way that best serves their communicative purposes (whatever these may be: information transfer, transfer of emotions,...). Moreover, they provide hearers the guidelines to decipher the intended meaning of utterances that are in conflict with the maxims (henceforth, these will be called uncooperative utterances). The
The author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Special Research Fund of Ghent University.
latter is done by deriving sentences that reconcile uncooperative utterances with the maxims (obviously, hearers will only do so in case they are convinced the speaker assumed they are capable to get at the actual meaning of the utterance in spite of its deviance from the prescriptions stated by the maxims). These derivations are obviously not deductive derivations, but pragmatic ones. Hence, the intrinsic features of this kind of derivations are distinct from those of deductive ones. Most importantly, the consequences of pragmatic derivations are only accepted in a defeasible way, meaning that they might be withdrawn at some point, for example in case the speaker explicitly rejects them, or because they conflict with the background knowledge shared by speaker and hearer (see e.g. [7] , [9] , [10] ).
The pragmatic rules that enable hearers to get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances, are called implicatures. As these rules yield defeasible consequences, Levinson [10, ch. 1] has argued convincingly that they should be captured formally as non-monotonic or default rules of inference. That is exactly what I will do in this paper: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme (see e.g. [2] , [3] ), I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures. The latter are based on linguistic scales, 1 which are partially ordered sets of sets of linguistic expressions ∆ 1 , ..., ∆ n (the partial ordering relation has to be defined over the sets of linguistic expressions "in a contextually salient way," see [10, p. 105] ). The linguistic expressions in ∆ i are considered more high-ranked than those in ∆ j in case i < j.
Example 1.
The following are all linguistic scales: and, or , all, most, many, some , succeed, try , book, {chapter 1, chapter 2, ...} ,...
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Scalar implicatures arise from linguistic scales in the following way: the assertion by a speaker of a sentence containing a low-ranked linguistic expression will force the hearer to implicate the negation of the corresponding sentences with more high-ranked expressions. For, so the reasoning goes, if the speaker would have been in a position to use a more high-ranked expression, he would have done so (in order to comply with the maxim of quantity that states that we should be as informative as our communicative purposes require us to be). get at the intended meaning of assertions made by speakers. Hence, I will simply presuppose that some linguistic scales are available to hearers in a particular conversational context. Formally, this means that the information available to the hearer in a conversational context is taken to be a couple Γ u ∪Γ bk , Γ ls , where Γ u represents the utterances made by the speaker (as they are heard by the hearer), Γ bk represents the background knowledge shared by both speaker and hearer (as supposed by the hearer), and Γ ls contains all linguistic scales that are available to the hearer in the particular context.
The Role of Classical Logic
The consequences obtained by means of pragmatic inference steps (in casu, scalar implicatures) are defeasible, which means that speakers might withdraw them at a certain point. The reasons for withdrawal can be twofold. First of all, new information might be acquired that is in conflict with the pragmatically derived conclusions (e.g. the speaker has made some new utterances). In formal terms, this comes down to non-monotonicity. Secondly, pragmatic consequences might also be withdrawn because the deductive consequences of some of the utterances made by the speaker contradict them. In practice, this comes down to the fact that people sometimes draw (wrong) pragmatic conclusions from utterances before they have full insight in what the speaker has actually said. Once they have obtained more insight (which, let's face it, might not happen at all), they will then withdraw these conclusions. Formally, this corresponds to the fact that people are not logically omniscient (which, in the approach presented below, is a strictly proof theoretic feature).
The second reason for withdrawing pragmatic consequences clearly shows that scalar implicatures are always applied against a deductive background (i.e. they are ampliative inference rules). Traditionally, this deductive background is captured by means of a standard logic (SL), 3 which means that the logical symbols (the logical connectives, modal operators,...) are interpreted standardly. However, when trying to explicate implicatures formally, interpreting the logical symbols in the standard way leads to the so-called implementation-problem (for a discussion related to the or-implicature, see [8] , [11] , [13] ). In short, this comes down to the fact that the implicatures either generate too many or too few pragmatic consequences (dependent on the way you determine when to withdraw pragmatic consequences). The problem is related to the fact that SL doesn't distinguish between sentences the hearer heard the speaker utter and sentences the hearer merely derived from those she heard the speaker utter. Obviously, the implicatures should only be applied to the former, not to the latter.
In this paper, the deductive background is captured by means of a nonstandard logic, viz the logic SL u , a particular extension of SL. 4 This logic is defined over the language L u that not only contains the standard logical symbols, but also contains utterance-symbols. The latter are non-standard logical symbols that are used to formally represent the utterances made by the speaker. More specifically, utterances are represented by sentences that only contain utterancesymbols (these are called utterance-sentences). The other information available to the hearer in a conversational context (i.e. the shared background knowledge) is represented by sentences only containing standard symbols (these sentences are called standard sentences). In view of section 1, this means that the set Γ u only contains utterance-sentences and that the set Γ bk only contains standard sentences! In this way, the logic SL u is able to formally make the distinction between sentences the hearer heard the speaker utter and sentences the hearer derived from those sentences. As a consequence, in the adaptive logics approach presented below, scalar implicatures will be captured as default inference rules that may only be applied to utterance-sentences. For, this avoids the implementation-problem in a way that resembles the actual reasoning process at hand.
A closing remark is necessary though. From an utterance-sentence A, it is always possible to derive the corresponding standard sentence B by means of the logic SL u . 5 As a consequence, despite the non-standard interpretation of the utterance-symbols, the hearer is still able to derive all standard deductive consequences from the utterances made by the speaker, as is shown by theorem 1.
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Theorem 1. For Γ the set of standard sentences corresponding to the utterancesentences in Γ u and for A a standard sentence:
The Adaptive Logics Approach
The adaptive logic SI s now captures the reasoning process of the hearer while trying to uncover the full intended meaning of the utterances made by the speaker in a conversational context. In line with the argumentation of Levinson [10, ch. 1], the adaptive logic SI s characterizes scalar implicatures proof theoretically as non-monotonic inference rules. Below, only a general (and quite intuitive) characterization of SI s will be given. 4 A specific SL u will be characterized in section 4.1. Moreover, the non-standard extension of propositional CL (called CL u ) has been characterized in [11] . 5 For a good understanding, the standard sentence B corresponding to the utterancesentence A is obtained by replacing all utterance-symbols in A by the corresponding standard symbols. 6 For all SL and SL u , the proof of theorem 1 is completely analogous to the proof of theorem 3 in [11, pp. 12-13] . Hence, no proof will be given in this paper.
General Characterization of SI
s . All standard adaptive logics are characterized completely by the following three elements: a lower limit logic (LLL), a set of abnormalities Ω (a set of formulas characterized by a logical form F), and an adaptive strategy. 7 In case of the logic SI s , the LLL is the logic SL u (see section 2). 8 Given a conversational context Γ u ∪ Γ bk , Γ ls , the consequences derivable from the premise set Γ u ∪ Γ bk by means of the logic SL u are called the deductive consequences of that premise set, which means that they are nondefeasible (i.e. they cannot be withdrawn!). In other words, the logic SL u is the stable, deductive background against which some defeasible inference steps can be made.
Where A[e] expresses that the linguistic expression e occurs in the formula A, the set of abnormalities Ω of SI s is defined as follows:
by (1) replacing all utterance-symbols by the corresponding standard symbols and (2) replacing the linguistic expression e by e }.
The defeasible consequences of the logic SI s (in casu, those representing the consequences obtained by applying scalar implicatures) are yielded by treating the abnormalities (the elements of Ω) in a particular way. More specifically, the logic SI s falsifies as many abnormalities as possible. In general, this comes down to the following: if a formula A ∨ Dab(∆) is an SL u -consequence of a premise set Γ (with Dab(∆) a finite disjunction of abnormalities), the formula A is considered an SI s -consequence of Γ on the condition that none of the abnormalities in ∆ can be interpreted as true.
The above implies that a formula A is a possible SI s -consequence of a premise set Γ in case A is either a deductive or a defeasible consequence of Γ . Formally, this is expressed as follows:
If ∆ = ∅, the formula A is a deductive consequence of Γ , while in case ∆ = ∅, A is a defeasible consequence of Γ . As deductive consequences of a premise set are derivable unconditionally, they necessarily enter the SI s -consequence set of a premise set. On the other hand, defeasible consequences are only derivable conditionally, so that some might have to be withdrawn from the SI s -consequence set of a premise set.
Which of the defeasible consequences have to be withdrawn, is determined by the Dab-consequences of the premise set, together with the adaptive strategy. 7 For an elaborated characterization of the standard format of adaptive logics, see e.g.
[2], [3] . 8 Obviously, the logic SI s will differ according to the particular logic SL u that is chosen as its LLL. Hence, one might say that there are multiple versions of the logic SI s . One of these will be characterized in section 4.2. In this section though, the logic SI s is characterized in general.
A Dab-consequence of a premise set Γ is a finite disjunction of abnormalities that is a deductively derivable from Γ .
As no abnormalities need to be falsified in order to derive a Dab-consequence from a premise set, a Dab-consequence of a premise set is true unconditionally. Hence, some of the disjuncts of a Dab-consequence have to be true. This implies that some (and possibly all) of the defeasible consequences obtained by presupposing the falsity of these disjuncts have to be withdrawn. In the end, the adaptive strategy is decisive, for the latter provides the guideline to cope with the abnormalities occurring in the Dab-consequences of a premise set. As the adaptive strategy of the logic SI s is the normal selections strategy, 9 a defeasible consequence of a premise set Γ obtained by presupposing the falsity of all abnormalities in ∆, is withdrawn in case the formula Dab(∆) is a Dab-consequence of Γ . Hence, in view of definition 2, SI s -derivability is defined as follows:
Example. 
Applying the Adaptive Framework
Let's consider a particular application of the general approach set out in the previous sections. More specifically, consider the cookie conversation below which contains some applications of scalar implicatures based on the linguistic scale All, Many, Some .
Example 4 (The Cookie Conversation). John's mother is talking to the nanny about John's eating behavior.
Mother Did John eat something this afternoon?
9 A lot of other strategies have been characterized in the adaptive logics literature (see e.g. [2] , [3] ), but these will not be considered here.
Nanny Yes, he ate some cookies.
implicates that John didn't eat many cookies. implicates that John didn't eat all cookies.
Nanny
In fact, he ate many.
forces withdrawal of John didn't eat many cookies. Mother He didn't eat them all, did he? Nanny No, he didn't.
In view of the linguistic scale present in the conversational context described above, viz the scale All, Many, Some , the assertion of the nanny that John ate some cookies, yields two scalar implicatures. For, from the nanny's assertion John's mother will pragmatically derive that John didn't eat all cookies, as well as that he didn't eat many of them. However, when the nanny afterwards asserts that John ate a lot of cookies, John's mother is forced to withdraw one of those pragmatic conclusions, viz the latter one.
Representation of Linguistic Expressions. To capture the implicatures involved in the cookie conversation, the language L of classical logic isn't satisfactory, for not all linguistic expressions in the linguistic scale All, Many, Some can be expressed by classical means. Hence, the standard logic SL capturing the deductive background against which the scalar implicatures are performed (see section 2) cannot be classical logic. Consequently, I will take SL to be a straightforward extension of classical logic, viz the logic CL ∃10 . The logic CL ∃10 is based on the language L ∃10 , obtained by adding the generalized quantifier ∃ 10 to the language L of classical logic. 10 This newly added quantifier expresses that there are at least ten objects in the domain for which something is the case. Consequently, the quantifier ∃ 10 is semantically characterized as follows:
Proof theoretically, the characterization of ∃ 10 is obtained by means of the following three axioms:
Soundness and completeness proofs for CL ∃10 are obtained by standard means. As a consequence, these are left to the reader.
Besides the quantifier ∃ 10 , the language L ∃10 also contains a number of defined quantifiers, viz the generalized quantifiers All, Many and Some. These are relational quantifiers, which means that they express a relation between two formulas A and B. For example, the quantifier All expresses that all objects that are A are B as well (the other quantifiers are explicated analogously). Formally, the quantifiers All, Many and Some are defined as follows:
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Definition 5. For α an individual variable:
Some remarks concerning these defined quantifiers are necessary. First of all, the quantifier Many is generally considered to be context-dependent (see e.g. [15] ). Hence, in function of the conversational context provided by the cookie conversation, I have arbitrarily taken Many to be at least ten. Secondly, the introduction of the defined quantifiers is necessary to capture the real meaning of the scalar implicatures occurring in the cookie example. More specifically, to capture the scalar implicature from some to not all. For, remember that a scalar implicature is obtained by negating a sentence in which a low-ranked linguistic expression (in casu, some) is replaced by a more high-ranked one (in casu, all ). In spite of appearances, one cannot capture this formally by deriving the negation of a formula in which the logical expression ∃ is replaced by the logical expression ∀. For example, consider the cookie conversation: suppose that (∃ α )(C α ∧E jα ) expresses that John ate some cookies (literally, the formula states that there are objects that are cookies and are eaten by John). Moreover, now suppose that one would (pragmatically) derive the formula ¬(∀ α )(C α ∧ E jα ) from the formula (∃ α )(C α ∧ E jα ). Obviously, that doesn't capture the intended meaning of the scalar implicature at all, for the derived formula doesn't state that John didn't eat all cookies, but states that not everything is a cookie and is eaten by John. The problem resides in the fact that this formula doesn't only refer to cookies, but also to tables, chairs,... Hence, John may well have eaten all cookies, as long as there is something that is not a cookie, the sentence still applies (which is obviously not what was intended). The quantifiers All, Many and Some are introduced to avoid this kind of mix up between linguistic and logical expressions.
Next Up. In the remaining of this paper, a particular version of the adaptive logic SI s will be characterized, viz the one that is able to capture the scalar implicatures occurring in the cookie conversation. This particular version of the logic SI s will be called CL s
∃10
. Well now, given the adaptive logics approach outlined in section 3, the lower limit logic of the logic CL s ∃10 is a particular extension of the logic standardly taken to capture the deductive background against which the scalar implicatures are performed. For the logic CL s ∃ , this is the logic CL u ∃10 , an extension of the logic CL ∃10 discussed above. Below, the logic CL u ∃10 will be characterized first (in section 4.1). Next, a characterization of the adaptive logic CL s ∃10 will be provided (in section 4.2). At the end, the cookie conversation will be reconsidered (in section 4.3).
The Lower Limit Logic CL u ∃10
The logic CL u ∃10 is based on the language L u ∃10 . The latter is obtained by adding to the language L ∃10 of CL ∃10 an utterance-symbolṡ for each standard logical symbol s. As a consequence, the utterance-symbols of the language L As their standard counterparts, the utterance-symbolsȦll,Ṁany andṠome are defined connectives.
Definition 6.
For α an individual variable:
Moreover, in the remaining of this paper, also the connectives ⊃, ≡,⊃ and≡ will be treated as defined connectives (defined in the standard way). Consequently, only the most essential logical symbols are taken to be primitive.
Finally, let S, P r , C, V, and W u ∃10 be respectively the set of sentential letters, the set of predicative letters of rank r, the set of individual constants, the set of individual variables, and the set of well-formed formulas of the language L , the set C ∪ O plays the role usually played by C, with this difference that there will be required that any element of the domain is named by at least one element of C ∪ O. As a consequence, the introduction of O greatly simplifies the semantic characterization of the quantifiers. 
Semantic Consequence. Remember that pseudo-constants were introduced merely as a semantic aid, to simplify the characterization of the quantifiers. However, pseudo-constants are not allowed in the premises nor the conclusion of arguments. Hence, semantic consequence is defined over formulas that do not contain any pseudo-constants. In other words, semantic consequence is defined over well-formed formulas of the language L Proof Theory. Proof theoretically, the logic CL u ∃10 is characterized completely by adding the axioms in table 1 to the axiom system of CL ∃10 (as described above). Proofs are defined in the standard way, as sequences of well-formed formulas each of which is either an axiom, a premise or a formula derived from earlier ones by application of a rule of inference. Consequently, derivability is defined as follows:
A iff there is a proof of A from B 1 , ..., B n ∈ Γ . 
Soundness and Completeness. Soundness and completeness for the logic CL u ∃10 is easily obtained by extending the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 in [11] . As the extensions are completely straightforward, this is left to the reader.
The Adaptive Logic CL s ∃10
The lower limit logic (LLL) of the logic CL s ∃10 is the logic CL u ∃10 described in section 4.1, and the adaptive strategy of CL s ∃10 is the normal selections strategy. Hence, before I can move on to the semantics and the proof theory, the set of abnormalities Ω still needs to be defined (in section 3 only a general characterization of Ω has been given -see definition 1).
only contain utterancesymbols; A , B are obtained from respectively A and B by replacing all utterance-symbols by the corresponding standard symbols}
only contain utterancesymbols; A , B are obtained from respectively A and B by replacing all utterance-symbols by the corresponding standard symbols} By defining Ω in this way, the logic CL s ∃10 is only able to capture scalar implicatures based on the linguistic scale All, Many, Some . Obviously, Ω can easily be extended in order to capture more scalar implicatures. To keep things as simple as possible, I will not do so here.
Semantics. The CL s ∃10 -semantics is based on the LLL-models of a premise set Γ . More specifically, to generate more consequences than the LLL, the CL s ∃10 -consequences are defined by reference to one or multiple selected sets of LLLmodels of Γ , i.e. sets of preferred LLL-models of Γ . Hence, the CL 
The adaptive strategy makes the actual selection among the CL u ∃10 -models. This is done by comparing their abnormal parts. As the adaptive strategy of the logic CL s ∃10 is the normal selections strategy, a selected set Σ is defined by means of a two-step procedure. First, the minimally abnormal models of a premise set Γ are defined.
Secondly, all minimally abnormal models that verify the same abnormalities, are grouped together into distinct sets. These sets are the selected sets of CL u ∃10 -models of a premise set Γ . Proof Theory. As the logic CL s ∃10 is a standard adaptive logic, its proof theory has some characteristic features shared by all adaptive logics (see also [2] , [3] ). First of all, a CL s ∃10 -proof is a succession of stages, each consisting of a sequence of lines. Adding a line to a proof means to move on to the next stage of the proof. Next, the lines of a CL s ∃10 -proof consist of four elements (instead of the usual three): a line number, a formula, a justification, and an adaptive condition. The latter is a finite subset of Ω (the set of abnormalities). As long as all elements of the adaptive condition of a line i can be considered as false, the formula on line i is considered as derivable from the premise set -remark that this is in accordance with the intuition set out in section 3. In order to indicate that not all elements of the adaptive condition of line i can be considered as false anymore, line i is marked (formally, this is done by placing the symbol next to the adaptive condition). Obviously, when a line is marked, the formula on that line is not considered as derivable anymore. Finally, markings are dynamic: at some stage of the proof, a line might be unmarked, while at a later stage, it might become marked.
14 Obviously, this proof theoretic dynamics corresponds to the dynamics involved in the use of scalar implicatures (as described in section 2).
Characterizing Proofs. Now, consider the CL The Premise Rule (PREM)
It is easily verified that the deduction rules are fully determined by the logic CL u ∃10 (the LLL of the logic CL s ∃10 ) and the set of abnormalities Ω. The marking definition on the other hand, strongly depends on the adaptive strategy.
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To determine whether or not a line has to be marked at a certain stage of a proof, the adaptive strategy of the logic CL s ∃10 , i.e. the normal selections strategy, refers to the Dab-consequences of the premise set that have been derived at that stage of the proof.
14 For some adaptive logics, lines that are marked might become unmarked as well.
Not for the logic CL s ∃10 though. 15 In general, the marking definition constitutes the only difference between the proof theories of adaptive logics that have identical lower limit logics and sets of abnormalities (see e.g. [2] ).
Definition 17. Dab(∆) is a Dab-consequence of a premise set Γ at stage s of a proof iff Dab(∆) is derived at stage s on the condition ∅.
More specifically, the normal selections strategy lays down that a line i with condition ∆ has to be marked at stage s in case Dab(∆) is a Dab-consequence of the premise set at stage s.
Definition 18 (Marking for Normal Selections). Line i is marked at stage s of the proof iff, where ∆ is its condition, Dab(∆) is a Dab-consequence of Γ at stage s.
Defining Derivability. A formula A is derivable from a premise set Γ iff A has been derived as the second element of an unmarked line in a proof from Γ . However, defining derivability this way is rather problematic. For, markings may change at every stage, so that for every new stage, it has to be reconsidered whether or not a formula is derivable from the premise set. Luckily, also a stable notion of derivability can be defined. It is called final derivability, which refers to the fact that for some formulas, derivability can only be decided at the final stage of a proof.
Definition 19. A is finally derived from Γ on a line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Because of its stability, the notion of final derivability is used to define the CL s ∃10 -consequence relation.
Definition 20. Γ CL s

∃10
A iff A is finally derived on a line of a proof from Γ .
Soundness and Completeness.
As CL s ∃10 is a standard adaptive logic, soundness and completeness follow immediately (see corollary 2 in [3] ). Hence, the soundness and completeness proofs for CL s ∃10 needn't be considered here.
The Cookie Conversation
Let's return to the cookie conversation one final time. Given the conversational context at hand, the information available to John's mother is represented as follows:
In CC, the set Γ u contains all sentences John's mother heard the nanny utter. Moreover, these utterances are placed in chronological order (actually, to represent the application of scalar implicatures in a realistic way, they should and will also enter the proof in this order). For reasons of simplicity, the set Γ bk is left empty. Nonetheless, this isn't necessarily the case, for there may be a lot of background knowledge shared by John's mother and nanny. For example, they might share knowledge about John's eating habits, his likes and dislikes, etc. Finally, the set Γ ls only contains one element, viz the linguistic scale All, Many, Some . This doesn't constitute a problem though, for it is the only linguistic scale present in this conversational context.
The Cookie Conversation Formally Remastered. The CL s ∃10 -proof below captures the cookie conversation from the viewpoint of John's mother. Hence, the proof starts with the utterance of the nanny that John ate some cookies (see line 1 below), followed by the defeasible consequences drawn from this utterance by means of the scalar implicatures based on the scale All, Many, Some (see lines 2 and 3 below).
1 (Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) -;PREM ∅ 2 ¬(Many α )(C α , E jα ) 1;RC {(Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) ∧ (Many α )(C α , E jα )} 3 ¬(All α )(C α , E jα ) 1;RC {(Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) ∧ (All α )(C α , E jα )} At stage 3 of the proof, no Dab-consequences of the premise set have been derived yet. Hence, no markings occur and all formulas derived on a line of the proof are considered as CL s ∃10 -derivable. However, the proof continues with the nanny's utterance that John actually ate a lot of cookies (see line 4). This obviously forces the withdrawal of one of the pragmatic conclusions drawn by John's mother (line 2 is marked). 1 (Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) -;PREM ∅ 2 ¬(Many α )(C α , E jα ) 1;RC {(Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) ∧ (Many α )(C α , E jα )} 3 ¬(All α )(C α , E jα ) 1;RC {(Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) ∧ (All α )(C α , E jα )} 4 (Ṁany α )(C α , E jα ) -;PREM ∅ 5 (Ṡome α )(C α , E jα ) ∧ 1,4;RU ∅ (Many α )(C α , E jα )
At stage 5 of the proof, a Dab-consequence has been derived on line 5. As a consequence, line 2 is marked, meaning that the formula on that line is not considered as CL s ∃10 -derivable anymore. On the other hand, line 3 is unmarked at stage 5 of the proof and it is easily verified that this will remain so, no matter how the proof is extended (no Dab-consequence yielding the marking of line 3 is derivable from the premise set). Moreover, this is also confirmed by the nanny's final utterance, viz that John didn't eat all cookies. Further Research. This paper dealt with scalar implicatures, which only constitute a (relatively small) fragment of all possible implicatures. It is still an open question whether those other implicatures can also be captured by means of adaptive logics. Moreover, all (scalar) implicatures in this paper were treated as having an equal priority. This is not always the case though. For, in certain conversational contexts, some (scalar) implicatures are given a higher priority than others. Despite the fact that the logic SI s cannot cope with this phenomenon, it should be possible to construct prioritized adaptive logics that can.
